Consider the following explanation:
(1) A is a proposition, namely the proposition that is true under no circumstances; (2) (AB) is a proposition, when A and B are, namely the proposition that is true on the condition that B is true, provided that A is true.
With this explanation I have accomplished an achievement comparable to that attempted by Frege in the Grundgesetze and defined a (formal) language L, the propositions of which can serve as contents of assertions and accordingly can be used for communication. With this definition I have accomplished an achievement comparable to that of Hilbert, and defined a metamathematical object-language OL, con-cerning which metamathematical theorems can be proved. 3 The explanation of the language L has no extremal clause and it is in principle open-ended, just like the formal languages of Frege, Lesniewski and Martin-Löf; nothing rules out there being other propositions than those provided by the explanations (1) and (2). In the case of OL, on the other hand, the extremal clause (iii) serves to confine its WFF 's to those provided by (i) and (ii).
2. In spite of their superficial formal similarity, there is a considerable difference between the two examples. The expressions in the language L can be used for stating truths. The WFF's of OL are not suitable tools for speaking or writing; they do not lend themselves for communication. Thus, (A((A(AA))((AA)A))) is true is a meaningful declarative sentence that can be used for effecting acts of assertion. The WFF
on the other hand, is only an object to be talked about and does not lend itself for carrying out assertions or other communicative acts. This important circumstance is often ignored owing to the written nature of both items.
WFF's are objects, (meta)mathematical objects, and, as such, only meant to be spoken about. Metamathematical object-languages so called are not properly languages; they do not comprise expressions that can be used for communication. In early authoritative expositions of Gödel's theory object languages are never exhibited. 4 Since object-language "expressions" are never -indeed cannot be -employed to say anything, but are only spoken about, the object-language is de facto abolished.
5 Instead, using clauses such as A VARIABLE is a number of the form 29+4k, k= 0,1,2, ….
one proceeds directly to the Gödel numbering, bypassing the object-language entirely. The object-"language" "expressions" are treated solely as objects. Donald Monk's excellent textbook is a telling example from within the metamathematical school of Tarski. A first-order language is nothing but a mathe- Accordingly any finite string (over any set) is taken as an expression; hence, strictly and literally anything goes: meaning is now of no concern whatever in a "text".
3. Consider the following definition of a function ) by means of metamathematical recursion over the set WFF's.
Hence ) 1 1oWFF, and )(k+1) WFF, for every k 1 1. where the exponentiation has been iterated 23 times, and so
This WFF is a certain (meta)mathematical object. If we want to refer to it, however, there is no other way available to us than to use some such device as the )-function. The definition of the set WFF runs completely parallel to the recursive definition of the natural numbers: where the corresponding extremal clause is the principle of definition by recursion/proof by induction, with respect to the natural numbers thus defined. In Constructive Type Theory, a set is defined by laying down how its canonical elements may be formed, and when two canonical elements are equal canonical elements of the set.
8 Non-canonical elements are equal when they evaluate to equal canonical elements. The canonical natural numbers are 0 and successors. The relevant specifications of equality are 0 = 0 1 1, that is, 0 is the same canonical element of N as 0, and
that is, when a and b are (not necessarily canonical) equal elements of N, their successors are equal canonical elements of N. There is no way that we can give the non-canonical element )(m) of the set WFF in a fully canonical form, without non-canonical parts. The string )(m) over the alphabet {A A , , ( , ) } has a length that is larger than (it is customary to claim on these occasions) the number of atoms in the known universe. On the other hand, ')(m)' is a real expression that stands for a metamathematical "expression", namely the (non-canonical) element )(m) of the set WFF. Metamathematical expressions do not express, owing to their lack of content; they are objects that can be expressed, using real expressions with meaning, for instance, as just mentioned, the expression ')(m)'.
If I want to use an expression (that eo ipso has meaning, owing to its nature), I cannot get by with a simulacrum such as a name of the expression; I need the expression itself and not its name. The name of a metamathematical OL "expression", on the other hand, is a real expression with content, but what it names is an object without meaning, namely an element of a freely generated algebra of strings.
Some might find it unnecessary or otherwise unprofitable to harp on this difference; what does it matter?
9 One then does well to recall that Tarski's [1933] truth-predicate is a propositional function with the set of WFF 's as its range of significance:
and thus
Furthermore, it is a true proposition, since
since AA is a true proposition, both constructively, with proof-object Ox.x, that is, the identity function on the (empty) set of proofs of A, and non-constructively in virtue of the truth-table for . An attempt to apply the Tarskian T-predicate would, however, turn into a fiasco. As already stressed, the range of significance for the propositional function T(x) consists of WFF's rather than propositions; an attempt to insert the proposition T(( A A A A )) into the argument place held by the variable that ranges over WFF's would rift asunder the categorical structure of our language and, concomitantly, also that of the world. It is important to realise that the expression 'c' is obtained from the meaning c. Without the meaning c being given in this way, there is no access to the expression 'c'. The expression is obtained from the meaning by disregarding what is given, namely the meaning (object) c and instead focusing on how (in what form) it is given, namely through the expression 'c'. If we consider the object (meaning) c and divest it of content what remains is the form 'c' through which it is given:
Only in virtue of its meaning-bearing role do we have access to the expression: when nothing is expressed, there is no expression. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus would say that the relation between the expression ("symbol") and what it expresses, or symbolises, is internal. For instance, somewhat later, concerning propositions, that is a special kind of expression, we find:
Ogden & Richards and Russell consider that the relation of proposition to fact is an external relation; this is not correct. It is an internal relation. An internal relation cannot be otherwise; it is given in the terms involved, in the nature of proposition and fact. an important relation of words to objects -or better -of words to other objects, some of which are not words -or even better, of objects some of which are words to objects some of which are not words.
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Without the object/meaning c, the expression, or "word", 'c', that is, the material embodiment of the meaning c, cannot exist, however; in the other direction, as soon as the meaning c is given, or "expressed", we have embodied the meaning c in the expression 'c'.
Frege, the Founding Father of modern logic, for one, was fully aware of these issues and held the right views:
As Sinn causes difficulties at times, one quickly decides to throw it out and then naturally retains the soulless signs. The progenitor of such a theory does not want to express Thoughts with his signs, but only to play according to certain rules. Thus, in no way truth is there at issue. … One empties the signs of content, in order to avoid inconvenient questions; nevertheless, one then also balks at acknowledging the signs as really empty.
14 From earlier formulations in Über Sinn und Bedeutung we know that Frege uses bezeichnen (designate) and bedeuten (signify) for the relation between the Zeichen (sign) and its Bedeutung.
Ein Eigenname (Wort, Zeichen, Zeichenverbindung, Ausdruck) drückt aus seinen Sinn, bedeutet oder bezeichnet seine Bedeutung. Wir drücken mit einem Zeichen dessen Sinn aus und bezeichnen mit ihm dessen Bedeutung.
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In view of the ambiguity in Bedeutung, perhaps first noted by Ignacio Angelelli, signification (significance?) might well be the best translation into The sense, furthermore, should, according to Frege, "contain a mode of givenness" for the signification:
Es liegt nun Nahe, mit einem Zeichen (Namen, Wortverbindung, Schriftzeichen) außer dem Bezeichneten, was die Bedeutung des Zeichen heißen möge, noch das verbunden zu denken, was ich den Sinn des Zeichens nennen möchte, worin die Art des Gegebenseins enthalten ist.
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In these formulations, the sign cannot be of the soulless kind, since then nothing is expressed. It is the sign with content (Inhalt) that expresses a sense (Sinn) containing (enthalten) a mode of givenness of, or for, the designated entity.
Ferdinand de Saussure must have developed his theory of the sign during the first decade of the twentieth century. His signe comprises two parts, the material signifiant and the conceptual signifié:
I call the combination of a concept and a sound-image a sign, but in current usage the term generally designates only a sound-image, a word, for example (arbor, etc.). One tends to forget that arbor is called a sign only because it carries the concept "tree", with the result that the idea of the sensory part implies the idea of the whole. … Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here were designated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the others. I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier [signifiant] ; the last two items have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. As regards sign, if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other. The similarity is obvious. The diagrams are isomorphic: Frege's soulless sign corresponds to De Saussure's acoustic image, which is the Scholastic vox, and the (mediating) concept employed by De Saussure (and the Scholastics) corresponds to Frege's Sinn. 20 For De Saussure, the sign is comprised out of two interlocking parts, namely the acoustic image and the concept. Accordingly, if we allow ourselves to be guided by the above correspondence, the Fregean sign would comprise the soulless sign and its sense. How, precisely, the sign expresses its sense, which, in its turn, contains a route to the designated entity, I do not see clearly. On the other hand, Frege's brief elucidation, in the by now classical essays from the 1890's, might not suffice for determining the precise relationship between the soulless sign, the sign, its sense, and designated entity, nor, indeed, were they What Is an Expression? 189 necessarily intended by Frege to do so. 21 Such underdetermination would not be surprising, given the modest stated task of those remarks, namely that of buttressing the early sections of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. On his own perception, Frege was offering aid towards understanding the technical work. Nothing indicates that he considered himself to have (created) a thoroughly worked out philosophy of language, including a complete semiotic.
Concerning the connection between sign and sense, Wittgenstein, in the Tractaus, is reasonably explicit, and certainly more so than Frege. A very late change, and possibly the last substantial one, in the step from the Prototractatus to the Tractatus, introduces the distinction between sign and symbol.
22 A symbol comprises a material part, the sign, in which the symbol is sinnlich wahrnehmbar (3.32). This part is accidental (3.34). Initially, any other choice would have done, but once the choice is made one has to live with it. Another aspect of the symbol is essential, namely what is common to all symbols that can serve the same purpose (3.341). For instance, the English colour-word red can serve the same purpose as the German rot. For Wittgenstein, "(P&Q)" and "a(aPaQ)" are the same symbol, because they serve the same purpose, namely that of effecting a certain (directed) partition in logical space, in virtue of having the same truth-table. That truth-table, incidentally, is yet a third way, according to Wittgenstein, of giving the same symbol. In all three cases, the (perceptible) sign component of the symbol differs from those of the other two, but the symbol, nonetheless, is the same.
Accordingly the Tractarian semiotic triangle is a more complex one:
Symbol: das Projizierte
In order to spell out the connections between the sign (Zeichen), symbol and what is essential in the symbol (das Wesentliche am Symbol) , that is, the Göran Sundholm 190 21 The footnotes [1893, pp. 5, 7, and 9] as well as the Vorwort to [1891] are relevant here. 22 Kremer [1997, pp. 101-107] is very helpful on these matters; in particular, he notes the connection to Sellars, more about which in the sequel. We may also attempt to capture this semiotic structure in a NEUTRAL TERMINOLOGY: sign -form -content.
Our semiotic structure can be applied also to non-linguistic matters. •house• n p *house* first to stress. 24 This chess example is by now very well-known, owing to its being used in Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen ( § 108). The white King -the chess piece, that is -in one sense is a strangely shaped piece of varnished wood. This piece of wood, which corresponds to De Saussure's acoustic image and to Wittgenstein's accidental aspect of the symbol, may of course serve in many roles, and can be used for many purposes, among which those given by:
(1) "Blunt instrument to be entered into evidence as Exhibit B, m'lud." (2) (unsuccessful) specimen of peasant religious art; (3) barbecue ignition-fuel; (4) a toy church-tower from a children's' box of bricks; (5) agglomeration of vanished carbon compounds (a chemical specimen); (6) totem in a phallic religion; (7) the Chess King.
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Why content has been largely lost in modern philosophy of language, why signs are held to be merely (the analogues of) dead wood, I cannot fathom. The conflation between real expressions (with content, and used for speaking) and metamathematical "expressions" (without content, only to be spoken about) that is often found in logic since the metamathematical turn around 1930 is, of course, a possible reason for, as well as a symptom of, the lack of content. Another is Quine's preference for objects in conjunction with his hostility to meaning that has led him to view expressions, say, the bearers of reference, solely as objects. His preferred relata in the reference relation are material objects. Again, content is lost, but for Quine, this is neither unexpected nor unwelcome.
I have been concerned to spell out a difference between words ("expressions") and objects: words just are not just objects. Respecting this difference has far-reaching consequences for how semantics should be done. For instance, it is not at all clear that current theories of reference that are patterned on the evaluation-functions for terms in Tarskian metamathematical theories of truth are able to serve as Fregean theories of reference. And how do the various approaches to definite descriptions fare when one takes the difference between word and object seriously? An elaboration of a certain Proper Names Theory for Definite Descriptions (!!) that flows naturally on my approach will however have to wait for another occasion, so as not to tax the Editorial patience beyond endurance.
